Este artigo analisa a importância do papel desempenhado pelo diplomata George Frost Kennan na elaboração da política externa dos Estados Unidos durante a Guerra Fria. Ao final da Segunda Guerra Mundial, no contexto marcado pelas apreensões relativas às rivalidades globais entre os EUA e a URSS, Kennan recomendou uma estratégia com a intenção de conter as potenciais tendências expansionistas da União Soviética. Em sua consideração, a principal ameaça posta pela União Soviética não era militar, mas sua (...) capacidade de influência ideológica, veiculada pelos partidos comunistas e seus seguidores no interior das sociedades democráticas ocidentais. Desta hipótese precedente, Kennan arquitetou a Doutrina de Contenção, uma estratégia crucial da política externa dos Estados Unidos durante a Guerra Fria. Como um diplomata de carreira e grande autoridade nos estudos relacionados à sociedade Soviética, Kennan escreveu durante a sua vida uma extraordinária obra relacionada à diplomacia dos EUA e aos seus desafios colossais no ambiente do conflito global. No entanto, desde o início da segunda Administração Truman, Kennan observou que a estratégia estadunidense em relação à Guerra Fria havia se tornado mais militarista e intensificado a corrida armamentista. Ao assumir uma posição crítica em relação a essas diretrizes, que, de acordo com a sua perspectiva, levava à distorção da sua concepção original da teoria da Contenção, Kennan foi marginalizado pelo novo Secretário de Estado, Dean Acheson e deslocado do núcleo de elaboração política do governo. Posteriormente, ele questionou a adopção da Doutrina Truman, a criação da OTAN e o envolvimento dos Estados Unidos nas guerras da Coréia e do Vietnam.George Frost Kennan and the architecture of U.S. Foreign Policy in the genesis of the Cold War This article analyzes the major role performed by diplomat George Frost Kennan in the United States Foreign Policy during the Cold War. By the end of World War II, amidst apprehensions concerning the U.S. and the USSR global rivalries, Kennan recommended a strategy intending to contain the potential expansionist tendencies of the Soviet Union. In his consideration, the core threat upraised by Soviet Union was not military, but its ideological influence conveyed by Communist parties and fellow travelers inside the western democratic societies. From this preceding hypothesis, Kennan designed the doctrine of containment, a crucial strategy of U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War. As a career diplomat and major authority on Soviet society, Kennan wrote during his lifetime an remarkable work related to U.S. diplomacy and its colossal challenges in the environment of that global conflict. Nonetheless, since the inauguration of the second Truman administration, Kennan observed that U.S. Cold War strategy had become more militaristic and that it had strengthened the arms race. For assuming a critical position towards this path, which, according to his perspective, was a distortion of his original containment theory, Kennan was marginalized by the new Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, and displaced from core government power. Subsequently, he stood up against the adoption of the Truman Doctrine, the creation of NATO and the commitment of the United States in the Korean and Vietnam wars. Resumen George Frost Kennan y la arquitectura de la política externa de los EUA en el origen de la Guerra Fría Este artículo analiza la importancia del papel desempeñado por el diplomático George Frost Kennan en la elaboración de la política externa de los Estados Unidos durante la Guerra Fría. Al finalizar la Segunda Guerra Mundial, en el contexto marcado por las aprehensiones vinculadas a las rivalidades globales entre los EUA y la URSS, Kennan recomendó una estrategia con la intención de contener las potenciales tendencias expansionistas de la Unión Soviética. En su entendimiento, la principal amenaza de la Unión Soviética no era militar, y sí su capacidad de influencia ideológica, vehiculada por los partidos comunistas y sus seguidores en el interior de las sociedades democráticas occidentales. Partiendo de esta hipótesis, Kennan ideó la Doctrina de Contención, una estrategia crucial de la política externa de los EEUU durante la Guerra Fría. Como diplomático de carrera y una autoridad en estudios relacionados a la Unión Soviética, Kennan escribió durante su vida una extraordinaria obra relacionada a la diplomacia estadounidense y sus desafíos colosales en el ambiente del conflicto global. Sin embargo, desde el inicio de la segunda administración Truman, Kennan observó que la estrategia de los EUA en relación a la Guerra Fría se había tornado más militarista, intensificándose la carrera armamentista. Al asumir una posición crítica en relación a estas directrices que, de acuerdo a su perspectiva, conducía a la distorsión de su original teoría de la Contención, Kennan fue marginado por el nuevo Secretario de Estado, Dean Acheson, y desplazado del núcleo de elaboración política del gobierno. Posteriormente, él cuestionó la adopción de la Doctrina Truman, la creación de la OTAN y la participación de Estados Unidos en las guerras de Corea y de Vietnam. (shrink)

George F. Kennan's political realism defines the object of diplomacy as the pursuit of the national self-interest and renders legitimate any means which expediently serve that purpose.

Isaiah Berlin is a classic name in political theory, but does he have anything to teach us about international relations? In the Cold War he was a realist disciple of the containment doctrine, indeed a more hawkish container than his friend George Kennan, at least until he saw what was happening in Vietnam. In the aftermath of the Cold War, confronted with an outburst of resurgent nationalism, he seemed more like a utopian idealist, dreaming with Herder of a (...) world of cultural harmony. But that dream is undermined by his own value pluralism, which points towards something more rigorous and interesting, a case for liberal internationalism in tension with its realist rival. From a value-pluralist point of view, realism tends towards moral monism, and liberal internationalism is normatively the more balanced view. However, liberals should still take seriously the central realist insight that security is an especially important value in the anarchic international context. (shrink)

This item of 1951 gives insight into the development of Berlin's thinking about liberty and related themes. He identified the crucial importance of ‘the Kantian morality’ for his purposes, and contrasted this with consequentialists, Hegel and Marx.

Classical realism is enjoying a renaissance in the study of international relations. It is well known that the analytical and normative international-political thought of early 20th-century classical realists is based on assumptions about human nature. Yet current knowledge of these assumptions remains limited. This article therefore revisits and examines the nature and intellectual roots of the human nature assumptions of three truly consequential classical realists. The analysis shows — similar to the causa Hans J. Morgenthau — that the human nature (...) assumptions of George F. Kennan, Walter Lippmann and E. H. Carr are — to varying degrees — Freudian. Unless this hitherto neglected dimension is recognized, an understanding of their international-political thought and of the political philosophy of realism remains incomplete. Two conclusions are presented. First, current criticism of classical realism’s human nature assumptions is unjustified. Second, any (re-) engagement with classical realism must recognize its human nature baggage. Realist international-political theorizing is necessarily human nature-based international-political theorizing. (shrink)

In Polish historiography on radio in the Stalinist period, the official propaganda broadcast by Polish Radio is very often juxtaposed with the free and unbiased broadcasting of Radio Free Europe (RFE), which can create the impression that RFE was the only source of information in Poland and tends to diminish the importance of Polish Radio. In fact, both broadcasting institutions were crucial players in Cold War warfare, which was described by George F. Kennan in terms of Clausewitz's “fog (...) of war.” Indeed, both RFE and Polish Radio were listening to each other through the Iron Curtain because “white propaganda” (along with the intelligence obtained from political refugees) was one of the most important sources of information. The two broadcasting stations were more alike than we are willing to admit. For instance, the Polish section of RFE mimicked the post-war strategy of Polish Radio. While the latter pretended to be the continuation and successor of the pre-war institution, RFE's propaganda shaped the programme of Polish Radio for many years. Using this case study on RFE's attitude toward Poland's western borders along the Odra and Nysa Rivers, I show how these two opposing broadcasting stations functioned within an endless propaganda feedback loop. (shrink)

In an introduction to Louis J. Halle's Civilization and Foreign Policy, Dean Acheson notes with approval that Halle believed a group of men, formerly members of the Policy Planning Staff of the United States State Department, to be seeking a new theory of foreign policy which would lie outside the traditional theory. Halle's work, like that of the others whose names were mentioned (George F. Kennan, Paul Nitze, and C. B. Marshall), represented a serious and searching analysis of (...) the conceptual frame of American foreign policy, a search largely accompanied by a demand for a more realistic consideration of problems of power. The members of the Policy Planning Staff were by no means the only, or even the first, Americans to question American thinking on foreign policy from the standpoint of power politics. Without going back to Alexander Hamilton, we must consider, in particular, Hans J. Morgenthau and Reinhold Niebuhr. This kind of thinking is still being advanced; and, more recently, the warning that Americans misunderstood the problem of power was put with some forcefulness by Robert Endicott Osgood : “More than any other great nation, America's basic predispositions and her experience in world politics encourage the dissociation of power and policy.” There is no doubt that work of recent years has shown the increased seriousness of American interest in the problems of foreign policy and civilization. The contribution which these and other writers have made is a very great one. Despite many differences among themselves, their trend seems to embody a certain oneness, which lies in a perception of the problems of power. Acheson points to the practical experience of the State Department group and their intention to “see life steadily and see it whole,” in Matthew Arnold's famous phrase. Yet, a few years after these writers, whom Acheson so highly regarded, had tried to acquaint the American people with the realities of power in foreign policy, one of them, George F. Kennan, was publicly criticized by Acheson himself for “never having understood the realities of power politics.” Shortly thereafter, Acheson, in his latest book, reiterated the charge that “power politics” was, for Americans, still a derogatory term. Kennan, one of our most thoughtful and sensitive writers on foreign policy, and Acheson, one of our most articulate and eloquent secretaries of state, had failed to satisfy the American people, and Kennan had failed, apparently, to satisfy Acheson regarding the significance and the reality of power politics. Yet in the light of some of the literature which has appeared since the rise of these writers, whom we may call “realists” though they do not necessarily so characterize themselves, one may question whether the danger is still that which Acheson described. One who reads Henry A. Kissinger's Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy may wonder not whether Americans understand the realities of power but whether, indeed, some of them understand anything else. We face the danger that the wheel may come full circle, that a naïve idealism may be replaced by a purely methodical realism, and that the very words “politics” and “strategy” may become interchangeable terms. We face that danger, but let no one suspect that Americans, in general, have succumbed to it. (shrink)

Identity Economics provides an important and compelling new way to understand human behavior, revealing how our identities--and not just economic incentives--influence our decisions. In 1995, economist Rachel Kranton wrote future Nobel Prize-winner George Akerlof a letter insisting that his most recent paper was wrong. Identity, she argued, was the missing element that would help to explain why people--facing the same economic circumstances--would make different choices. This was the beginning of a fourteen-year collaboration--and of Identity Economics. The authors explain how (...) our conception of who we are and who we want to be may shape our economic lives more than any other factor, affecting how hard we work, and how we learn, spend, and save. Identity economics is a new way to understand people's decisions--at work, at school, and at home. With it, we can better appreciate why incentives like stock options work or don't; why some schools succeed and others don't; why some cities and towns don't invest in their futures--and much, much more. Identity Economics bridges a critical gap in the social sciences. It brings identity and norms to economics. People's notions of what is proper, and what is forbidden, and for whom, are fundamental to how hard they work, and how they learn, spend, and save. Thus people's identity--their conception of who they are, and of who they choose to be--may be the most important factor affecting their economic lives. And the limits placed by society on people's identity can also be crucial determinants of their economic well-being. (shrink)

The realities and myths of long-term care and the challenges it poses for the ethics of autonomy are analyzed in this perceptive work. The book defends the concept of autonomy, but argues that the standard view of autonomy as non-interference and independence has only a limited applicability for long term care. The treatment of actual autonomy stresses the developmental and social nature of human persons and the priority of identification over autonomous choice. The work balances analysis of the ethical concepts (...) associated with autonomy with discussion of the implications of the ethical analysis for long term care. A central chapter involves a phenomenological analysis of four general features of everyday experience (space, time, communication, and affectivity) and explores their practical implications for long term care. This work concludes with a discussion of the advantages associated with a phenomenologically-inspired treatment of actual autonomy for the ethics of long-term care. (shrink)

Reinhold Niebuhr (1892-1971) may have been the most influential and insightful American thinker of the twentieth century. In dealing with the intricacies of human nature, society, politics, ethics, theology, racism and international relations, Niebuhr the teacher, preacher, philosopher, social critic and ethicist, was highly influential and difficult to ignore during the Second World War and Cold War eras because of his intellectual heft and the novel manner in which he addressed the economic, spiritual, social and political problems of his time. (...) This book distils Niebuhr's disparate and now difficult to access work into one volume, making it more easily accessible than ever before, at the same time bringing his work into the twenty first century. It argues that if he were alive today Niebuhr would be a champion of the U.N, a supporter of globalization, a fierce opponent of America's 2003 Iraq War (for all the reasons he opposed the Vietnam War), an advocate of the Responsibility to Protect, and a pragmatic hawk on China as it rises today. It also highlights his many contributions to international relations theory, from Realism to Liberalism to existentialism to the English School to constructivism. This is the first book that focuses exclusively on the international relations thought of Reinhold Niebuhr, one of Classical Realism's most important figures, one whom diplomat and Realist George Kennan called, "the father of us all.". (shrink)

The epic wisdom contained in a lost library helps the author turn his life aroundIn American Philosophy, John Kaag--a disillusioned philosopher at sea in his marriage and career--stumbles upon a treasure trove of rare books on an old estate in the hinterlands of New Hampshire that once belonged to the Harvard philosopher William Ernest Hocking. The library includes notes from Whitman, inscriptions from Frost, and first editions of Hobbes, Descartes, and Kant. As he begins to catalog and preserve these (...) priceless books, Kaag rediscovers the very tenets of American philosophy--self-reliance, pragmatism, the transcendent--and sees them in a twenty-first-century context. Hocking was one of the last true giants of American philosophy. After studying under Harvard's Philosophical Four--William James, George Santayana, Josiah Royce, and George Herbert Palmer--he held the most prestigious chair at the university for the first three decades of the twentieth century. And when his teachers eventually died, he collected the great books from their libraries (filled with marginalia) and combined them with his own rare volumes at his family's estate. And there they remained for nearly eighty years, a time capsule of American thought. Part intellectual history, part memoir, American Philosophy is an invigorating investigation of American pragmatism and the wisdom that underlies a meaningful life. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:CHARITY LOST: TBE SECtJLA'.RIZATfON OF THE PRINCIPLE OF DOUBLE EFFECT IN THE JUST-WAR TRADITION TIMOTHY M. RENICK Georgia State University Atlanta, Georgia 0 N AUGUST 12, 1945, the city of Hiroshima still smoldered, and President Harry Truman addressed the American people : We have used [the atomic bomb] against those who have attacked us without warning at Pearl Harbor, against those who have starved and beaten and executed American (...) prisoners of war, against those who have abandoned all pretense of obeying international laws of warfare. We have used it in order to shorten the agony of war.1 Truman and his military advisers had made a calculation. Japan was preparing for a last-ditch defense of the Japanese Islands. The prospect was ominous, to say the least. The United States had suffered eighty thousand casualties in the taking of the smaller and less protected Okinawa just two months earlier; 120,000 Japanese soldiers had been killed (and only ten-thousand taken prisoner). Strategists estimated that losses, both military and civilian, from a full scale battle for Japan itself would exceed one million. Surely the tens of thousands killed by exploding a bomb over Hiroshima was the lesser evil. Surely this was a proportionate act : fifty thousand lives traded for a million. As Winston Churchill wrote in support of Truman's decision: "To avert a vast, indefinite butchery... at the cost of a few explosions seemed, after all our toils and perils, a miracle of deliverance." 2 1 Michael Walzer, lust and Unjust Wars (New York: Basic Books, 1979), p.164. 2 Ibid., pp. 266-267. 441 442 TIMOTHY M. RENICK From an ethical perspective, however, the act was anything but a deliverance. I am not alone in this assessment. Advocates of the just-war tradition including Elizabeth Anscombe, Paul Ramsey, George Kennan, John Langan, and Michael Walzer have condemned the bombing of Hiroshima by means of a shared just-war argument.8 The argument goes as follows, and it is a good one. In times of war, many actions are likely to have both good and evil effects. One destroys an enemy's munitions factory (good effect) but kills an innocent child in the process (evil effect). The jus in bello of the just-war tradition, however, stipulates that an action which has a " double effect " is permissible if and only if: ( 1) it is discriminate (i.e., the actor aims only at the good effect and does not intend the evil effect, nor is the evil effect a means to the end, however good); and (2) it is proportionate (i.e., the good created by the act outweighs the bad).4 Now, the argument continues, Truman's decision to bomb Hiroshima failed the first criterion. It was not a discriminate act because the evil effect (the killing of tens of thousands of Japanese civilians) was not unintended. In fact, the evil was the very means to the good end. Although Truman himself claimed to have selected Hiroshima as a target because it was "a war s See, for example, G. E. M. Anscombe, "Mr. Truman's Decision," in Ethics, Religion and Politics (Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota, 1981); M. Walzer "Supreme Emergency," in Just and Unjust Wars; and John Langan, "The American Hierarchy and Nuclear Weapons," Theological Studies 43 (1982) : 447-467. ' I utilize here a helpful shorthand version of the principle of double effect introduced by Paul Ramsey in War and the Christian Conscience (Durham, North Carolina: Duke, 1961). More frequently, the principle is rendered by means of four criteria: It is permissible to perform an act likely to have evil consequences if and only if (I) the act is good in itself or at least indifferent; (2) the direct effect is morally justified; (3) the actor aims only at the acceptable effect and does not intend the evil effect, nor is the evil effect a means to the end, however good ; and (4) there is in the good effect a proportionately grave reason for permitting the evil effect. The shortened version of the theory captures all components essential to my discussion and enhances clarity. I thus will make use of it throughout this essay. CHARITY AND... (shrink)

Many systems of logic diagrams have been offered both historically and more recently. Each of them has clear limitations. An original alternative system is offered here. It is simpler, more natural, and more expressively and inferentially powerful. It can be used to analyze not only syllogisms but arguments involving relational terms and unanalyzed statement terms.

Writing from a country shattered by two World Wars and by Nazi barbarism, Friedrich Meinecke, Germany's foremost historian of this century, was deeply troubled by the problem of reconciling power and justice in international affairs. This study of his political philosophy traces his thinking about nationalism and power politics, the dilemmas that beset the man of action in political life, and the possibility of "ethics in a world of power." Historians, political scientists, philosophers, and students of international affairs will welcome (...) this further contribution to a theme highlighted by such contemporary spokesmen as George Kennan m1d Reinhold Niebuhr. The author studied under Meinecke and used primary sources in Germany. Originally published in 1958. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905. (shrink)

The philosopher and critic George Henry Lewes published this work in two volumes in 1845–6. This is a reissue of an 1892 printing, which brought the volumes into one book. Lewes wrote widely on literature, science and philosophy, and was also the long-term intimate companion of George Eliot. This book is a narrative history, rather than an encyclopedia, of key philosophers. It is, therefore, a partial and personal study instead of an exhaustive textbook. The first volume concentrates solely (...) on Greek philosophy, beginning with the Pre-Socratics and ending with the Neo-Platonists. The second volume jumps to Francis Bacon, concentrating on British, German and French philosophy, and addressing, among others, Spinoza, Locke, Hume and Kant, and ending with Auguste Comte. Containing both historical anecdotes and pithy analyses of ideas, this book reflects the expertise and intellectual sympathies of a Victorian polymath. (shrink)

This article discusses the approach of the Clinical Ethics Consultation Advisory Committee (CECA) in developing A Case-Based Study Guide for Addressing Patient-Centered Ethical Issues in Health Care. This article addresses the processes used by the CECA, its use of pivot questions intended to encourage critical reflection, and the target audience of this work. It first considers the salience of case studies in general education and their relevance for training ethics consultants. Second, it discusses the enfolding approach used in presenting the (...) case material designed to engage the trainee in the details of the case while stimulating critical reflection. And, third, this article briefly comments on the target audience with the caveat that even superbly developed cases are prone to misuse, although that prospect should not deter their development. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:186 Reviews 1914: GREY AND PEACE OR WAR Kenneth Blackwell Margaret MacMillan. The War That Ended Peace: the Road to 1914. Toronto: Allen Lane, 2013. Pp. xxxv, 739. isbn: 978 0 670 06404 5. c$38.00 (hb). ith the advent of the centenary of wwi, and of Russsell’s criticisms of Sir Edward Grey in his minutely historical “The Policy of the Entente” (1915; in Papers 13) for Britain’s participation in (...) it, one needs a readable history of the intense diplomatic manoeuvres during the years leading up to the war. MacMillan provides that history, with period illustrations and asides to our day about substituting “prestige” for “honour”, preventive war (a term that isn’t indexed), and even George Kennan’s long telegram. Russell claimed Grey misled Parliament repeatedly about Britain’s commitments (see FO, pp. 501–2). Yet Russell’s 1948 essay “Democracy and Foreign Policy” almost excuses Grey’s covert actions as due to the fear of populist hostility to Germany preventing “the last possibility of general pacification”. It is astonishing how much popular hatred of Germany is revealed in MacMillan’s book. She points out that this was a country “which had been created by war” (p. 294); however, that does not seem special. On page 584 “June 21” must be “July 21”. t... (shrink)

This book explores the mindset of American government officials who decided that necessity required that American democracy should be defended by actions and policies contrary to traditional ideals of democracy. The works of Aristotle, current mental health professionals, Edmund Burke, Reinhold Niebuhr, Friedrich Meinecke, and George Kennan bolster this analysis.

English summary: Friedrich Schleiermacher's work as a theologian and Plato scholar marked the start of a new epoch: as a system-forming philosopher, he claimed independent validity, and as church politician, educational policy-maker, and academic theorist, he was one of the most important figures during the Prussian reforms, whose contributions to pedagogy remain influential to this day. This volume provides a clear-sighted overview of the various stages in Schleiermacher's life (1768-1834), with each contribution portraying his fields of work and their contexts, (...) placing his literary work and conceptions in the framework of the respective contemporary debates. Important stages in Schleiermacher reception and impact history are likewise considered. The authors' diverse approaches to interpreting and understanding his output mean that the Guide to Schleiermacher offers concentrated insight into the consensus on and controversies in current Schleiermacher research. German description: Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834) hat als Theologe, aber auch als Plato-Forscher Epoche gemacht; als systembildender Philosoph erhob er selbstandigen Geltungsanspruch, als Kirchen- und Bildungspolitiker sowie als Theoretiker der Universitat gehorte er zu den wichtigsten Akteuren der preussischen Reformen, und seine Beitrage zur Padagogik wirken bis heute nach. Die Gliederung des Handbuchs folgt grob Schleiermachers Lebensstationen. Die einzelnen Beitrage schildern seine Arbeitsfelder und -kontexte und stellen seine literarischen Arbeiten und Entwurfe in den jeweiligen zeitgeschichtlichen Debattenlagen dar. Auch wichtige Stationen seiner Wirkungs- und Rezeptionsgeschichte werden thematisiert.Die Autorinnen und Autoren der Beitrage verfolgen ganz unterschiedliche Interpretations- und Deutungsansatze. Deshalb bietet das Handbuch auch einen konzentrierten Einblick in den gegenwartigen Stand der Schleiermacher-Forschung mit ihren Konsensen und ihren Kontroversen. Mit Beitragen von: Christian Albrecht, Andreas Arndt, Bernd Auerochs, Ulrich Barth, Albrecht Beutel, Georg Eckert, Hermann Fischer+, Ursula Frost, Albrecht Geck, Simon Gerber, Wilhelm Grab, Peter Grove, Matthias Heesch, Eilert Herms, Kirsten Huxel, Walter Jaeschke, Lutz Kappel, Hans-Martin Kirn, Dietz Lange, Inken Madler, Helmut Merkel, Martin Ohst, Claus-Dieter Osthovener, Hermann Patsch, Reiner Preul, Andreas Reich, Joachim Ringleben, Jan Rohls, Martin Rossler, Dirk Schmid, Friedemann Voigt, Folkart Wittekind, Matthias Wolfes. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in (...) the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

Philosophy and its descendents in the behavioral sciences have traditionally divided incentives into those that are sought and those that are avoided. Positive incentives are held to be both attractive and memorable because of the direct effects of pleasure. Negative incentives are held to be unattractive but still memorable (the problem of pain) because they force unpleasant emotions on an individual by an unmotivated process, either a hardwired response (unconditioned response) or one substituted by association (conditioned response). Negative incentives are (...) divided into those that are always avoided and those that are avoided only by higher mental processes—archetypically the passions, which are also thought of as hardwired or conditioned. Newer dichotomies within the negative have been proposed, hinging on whether a negative incentive is nevertheless sought (“wanted but not liked”) or on an incentive's being negative only because it is confining (the product of “rule worship”). The newer dichotomies have lacked motivational explanations, and there is reason to question conditioning in the motivational mechanism for the older ones.

Both experimental findings and the examination of common experience indicate that even the most aversive experiences, such as pain and panic, do not prevail in reflex fashion, but because of an urge to attend to them. The well-established hyperbolic curve in which prospective rewards are discounted implies a mechanism for such an urge, as well as for the “lower” incentives in the other dichotomies. The properties of these lower incentives are predicted by particular durations of temporary preferences on a continuum that stretches from fractions of a second to years. (shrink)

Some recent discussions of corporate loyalty have found it misguided, while others see it as crucial for financial success. Thereis also disagreement over the nature of loyalty. This article analyzes the concept of loyalty, arguing that it is neither a duty nor a virtue(although it has overlaps with those categories), but a passion related to various virtues (and vices). Contrary to standard accounts ofcapitalism, loyalty does not necessarily oppose self-interest. Furthermore, corporations can and should be communities, andinsofar as they are, (...) they are proper objects for loyalty. If corporations are not communities, then loyalty to them cannot exist. (shrink)

An approach to the treatment of inference in the presence of uncertain truth values is described, based on representing uncertainties by sets of ordinary (certain) truth values. Both the algebraic and the logical aspects are studied for a variety of lattices used as truth value spaces in the domain of many-valued logic.

This chapter focuses on Gadamer's debts to figures and themes in German idealism, focusing in particular on Kant and Hegel.

ON THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF ETHICAL SENTIMENT. Of all the remaining productions of the ancient world, there is nothing which is more characteristic and ...